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We estimate the strength of schooling externalities for Spanish regions over
the 1981-2001 period. Our empirical work employs both main approaches
available in the literature. Both methodologies yield signiﬁcant externalities.
Using a growth accounting exercise, we ﬁnd that human capital externalities
account for one half of the increase in real wages for the period between 1981
and 2001.








Estimating human capital externalities—the diﬀerence between the social
and the private marginal returns to human capital—is important for various
reasons. First, the strength of such externalities determines the optimal sub-
sidies to education and to immigration of highly qualiﬁed workers. Second,
human capital externalities have been emphasized as a key for understanding
the process of economic growth (e.g. Lucas (1988)). It is therefore not too
surprising that there are a variety of estimation approaches and estimates in
the literature (e.g. Rauch (1993); Black and Henderson (1999); Acemoglu
and Angrist (2001); Rudd (2000); Moretti (2004a); Moretti (2004b); Ciccone
and Peri (2006)).
For Spain there is much less work however. The available estimates of
the return to human capital almost all reﬂect private returns (e.g. Alba and
Segundo (1995); Barceinas, Oliver, Raymond, and Roig (2000); Raymond
(2002); De la Fuente (2003) and De la Fuente, Domenech, and Jimeno
(2003)). As far as we know, there are only three attempts to estimate social
returns to education or externalitities. De la Fuente and Domenech (2005)
estimate social marginal returns to education in the nineties while Alcala
and Hernandez (2005) estimate human capital externalities at the ﬁrm and
industry level. Garc´ ıa-Fontes and Hidalgo (2008) ﬁnd externalities using
aggregated regional data for the period 1980-2000. All these papers ﬁnd
evidence of positive signiﬁcant externalities for Spain.
There are currently two approaches in the literature to estimate human
capital externalities. The ﬁrst approach augments standard Mincerian wage
equations with variables that measure the level of human capital at the
regional level (e.g. Rudd (2000); Acemoglu and Angrist (2001); Moretti
(2004a)). This methodology estimates the strength of human capital exter-
nalities by looking at the eﬀect of regional human capital levels on individual
wages. The basic idea is that human capital externalities should show up in
individual wages once all relevant individual characteristics are controlled
for. A key assumption of this (Mincerian) approach is that workers with
diﬀerent levels of human capital are perfect substitutes in production. If
diﬀerent human capital levels are imperfect substitutes, the Mincerian ap-
proach yields a positive eﬀect of aggregate human capital on individual wages
even if the social return to human capital equals the private return (e.g. Ci-
ccone and Peri (2006)). The intuition is that with imperfect substitution, an
increase in the number of skilled workers implies an increase of the wages of
unskilled workers that more than oﬀsets the decrease in the wage of skilled








 phy (1992); Ciccone and Peri (2006)), as well as other countries (e.g. Angrist
(1995)) including Spain (Hidalgo (2009)), indicates that diﬀerent levels of
human capital are imperfect substitutes. Therefore the Mincerian approach
must be complemented with the so-called constant composition approach,
which yields consistent estimates of the wedge between the social and the
private return to human capital even if skilled and unskilled workers are im-
perfect substitutes (Ciccone and Peri (2006)). This approach estimates the
strength of human capital externalities as the marginal eﬀect of aggregate
human capital levels on average wages holding the labor force composition
constant. Ciccone and Peri show that this bias is directly related to the
wage diﬀerence between skilled and unskilled workers, and inversely related
to the elasticity of substitution. The smaller the wage premium of skilled
workers the smaller the bias introduced by the Mincerian approach.
In Garc´ ıa-Fontes and Hidalgo (2008) human capital esternalities are es-
timated for Spain at the regional level. Using the constant composition
approach, human capital externalities are estimated to be positive and sig-
niﬁcant. In the current paper human capital externalities are estimated
using both the Mincerian and constant composition approach, and the bias
of the Mincerian approach is quantiﬁed. This bias is expected to be signiﬁ-
cant and large in the presence of imperfect substitutability between workers
of diﬀerent skill levels1.
Both approaches yield evidence of signiﬁcant human capital externalities.
In line with theory, the Mincerian approach yields larger externalities than
the constant composition approach. The diﬀerence in the point estimate of
the externalities of human capital between the two approaches depends on
the particular speciﬁcation adopted, but has an approximate average value
of 11%. It can be therefore considered that the Mincerian approach provides
an upper bound for the estimation of human capital externalities, while the
constant composition approach provides a lower bound. Taking this into
account, and through a growth accounting exercise, we ﬁnd that human
capital externalities account for more or less one third of the increase in
wages for the period between 1981 and 2001.
A key issue when estimating human capital externalities at the regional
level is that changes in aggregate human capital levels are endogenous as
regions with higher productivity and wages may attract more skilled workers.
This makes it desirable to implement an instrumental-variables approach.
We present instrumental-variables estimates of the strength of human capital
1Hidalgo (2009) and Hidalgo, O’Kean y Rodr´ ıguez (2008) ﬁnd evidence in favor of








 externalities that instrument the regional increase in human capital levels
by the initial demographics of each region. In particular, we will show
that shares of young and old population age groups help to predict future
increases in human capital over the period we analyze, as older, retiring
workers had considerably lower schooling levels than young workers entering
the labor force.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the
relevant literature, while Section 3 reviews the two main empirical method-
ologies used and how the bias might be calculated. Section 4 presents the
data sources used. The main results are in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The strength of human capital externalities is deﬁned as the diﬀerence be-
tween the social and private marginal return to an additional unit of human
capital. Most empirical work focuses on the return to an additional year of
(formal) schooling. There is a very large literature on the private return to
an additional year of schooling, which has found the return to lie between 5
and 12% depending on the country and time period considered (e.g. Card
(1999)). There is less work estimating the strength of schooling externali-
ties. Rauch (1993) estimates schooling externalities in the US in 1980 using
a Mincerian wage equation augmented for state-level schooling measures.
The idea behind the Mincerian approach is that if there are externalities,
individual wages should be increasing in aggregate schooling levels control-
ling for individual characteristics, such as education, experience, gender, etc.
Rauch ﬁnd schooling externalities between 3 and 5%. Later contributions re-
ﬁne the Mincerian approach by using panel data to control for region ﬁxed
eﬀects and by employing instruments for the change in aggregate school-
ing levels, see Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Rudd (2000), Conley, Flier,
and Tsang (2003), Moretti (2004a), and Moretti (2004b)). The result vary
with the time period, the level of spatial aggregation, the country, and the
speciﬁcation. For example, while Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) do not ﬁnd
state-level average schooling externalities in the US over the 1960-1980 pe-
riod, Moretti (2004b) ﬁnds externalities from the share of college workers in
the US to be signiﬁcant at the city level for 1981-1991.
The Mincerian approach to human capital externalities assumes that
workers with diﬀerent human capital levels are perfect substitutes in pro-
duction. Perfect substitutability simpliﬁes identiﬁcation because it implies
that changes in the relative supply of human capital do not aﬀect the relative








 ity constant. Consequently, all the eﬀects that human capital supply changes
have on workers with a given level of human capital have to come through
total factor productivity and can be interpreted as externalities. Ciccone
and Peri (2006) show that when workers with diﬀerent human capital are
imperfect substitutes, the Mincerian approach overestimates the strength of
schooling externalities. They propose an alternative methodology that esti-
mates externalities as the marginal eﬀect of human capital on log average
wages holding labor-force composition constant.
This paper complements the existing literature for Spain. De la Fuente
and Domenech (2005) relate regional productivity growth to human capital
and other variables. They estimate a 16% elasticity of human capital, which
is larger than the elasticity estimated in previous works which is around
8%. They attibute the diﬀerence to the social return to education. Using an
internal rate of return approach, they estimate the social rate of return of
education to be between 10% and 12%. Taking the diﬀerence between the
private and the social return, externalities are estimated to be between 4%
and 5%. Alcal´ a and Hern´ andez (2005) estimate the externalities of human
capital at the ﬁrm level. Their estimates show a private return of 8% and
externalities equal to 4,7%.
3 Empirical Approaches to Human Capital Exter-
nalities
We now turn to the two approaches that we will use to estimate regional
schooling externalities in Spain.
3.1 The Mincerian approach
The main idea of the Mincerian approach to schooling externalities is to
introduce aggregate schooling levels as an additional explanatory variable
in an otherwise standard Mincerian wage equation. To estimate regional
schooling externalities, the approach can be implemented in two steps. In the
ﬁrst step, we regress the log of individual wages on individual characteristics,
like education, experience, and gender, and on region-time ﬁxed eﬀects.
The goal of this ﬁrst step is to estimate average regional wages net of the
private returns to the characteristics that determine individual productivity.
Formally, the ﬁrst step estimates













 where wirt is the wage of individual i in region r during year t, sirt is
individual years of schooling, zirt are K additional individual characteristics
that we may want to control for, and uirt captures the eﬀect of unobservable
variables. Region-time eﬀects are captured by αrt. These region-time eﬀects
capture ”cleaned” average regional wages at a given point in time.
In the second step, we regress the change in estimated ”cleaned” average
regional wages over time on the change in regional schooling levels,
∆ˆ αrt = ˆ αrt − ˆ αrτ = controls + θ∆ˆ hrt + vrt, (2)
where ∆hrt represents the change in schooling in region r between t and τ.
The strength of the schooling externalities in the Mincerian approach is equal
to θ. It is easy to add additional regional controls to this approach and to use
instrumental-variables techniques (if appropriate instruments are available).
Notice that all factors causing permanent diﬀerences in productivity and
wages across regions are diﬀerenced out when using this approach.
We will instrument the change in regional schooling levels over the 1981-
1991 period by 1981 demographic structure and the change in regional
schooling levels over the 1991-2001 period by 1991 demographic structure.
The idea is that, as younger generations got considerably more schooling
than those who retired over this period, regional schooling levels in the ab-
sence of migration should have been rising faster the larger younger relative
to older age groups in the regional population. With regional migration,
regional schooling levels also depend on the inﬂow and outﬂow of workers,
but we will show that regional demographics continue to matter.
3.2 The Constant Composition Approach
The Mincerian approach assumes that workers with diﬀerent levels of human
capital are perfect substitutes. The empirical evidence suggests that this is
often not the case (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Ciccone and Peri
(2006) for the for the United States; Angrist (1995) for Israel; and Hidalgo
(2009) for Spain). It is therefore interesting to also estimate schooling ex-
ternalities with an approach that can identify externalities whether diﬀerent
human capital levels are perfect or imperfect substitutes. Ciccone and Peri
(2006) develop an approach that can also be implemented in two steps.
The ﬁrst step consists of estimating ”cleaned” average wages at the
region-year level, just as in the case of the Mincerian approach. But now








 we therefore estimate,
log(wisrt) = αsrt +
K X
k=0
βstzisrt + uisrt; (3)
that is, we estimate (1) separately for each schooling level. As a result,
the ﬁxed eﬀects (αsrt) are now speciﬁc to a region, a year, and a level of
schooling (s). The region-year-schooling eﬀects αsrt are then aggregated
using the labor-force composition weights of a base year T, lsrT, to obtain










Ciccone and Peri (2006) show that the base year is best chosen in
the middle of the time period being analyzed. The log change in ﬁxed-
composition ”cleaned” average wages is then regressed on the change in
regional schooling levels,
log( ˆ wF
rt) − log( ˆ wF
rτ) = controls + θ∆hrt + vrt. (5)
Just like in the case of the Mincerian approach, it is easy to add controls
or implement an instrumental-variables approach.
3.3 Mincerian estimation bias
According to Ciccone and Pieri (2006), the bias of the Mincerian approach








where σ is the elasticity of substitution between more (skilled, s) and less
(unskilled, u) educated workers and the term in brackets is the wage pre-
mium of skilled workers. If we use Hidalgo, O’Kean and Rodriguez (2008)
average estimate for Spain of the elasticity of substitution between colleged-
educated workers and the rest of workers of 1.6 and assume a wage pre-
mium between 1980 and 2001 of approximately 40% as estimated by Hidalgo








 4 Data and Instruments
We use several data sources to implement the empirical approaches presented
above. Individual data on wage earnings and schooling come from the Survey
of Family Budgets2 corresponding to 1981 and 1991 (EPF-81 and EPF-91)
and the Continuous Survey of Family Budgets3 corresponding to 2000/01
(ECPF-00-01), which we pool. Our regional schooling data comes from
the Human Capital Project of the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones
Econmicas (IVIE). For robustness analysis, we also employ total regional
physical capital and ICT capital data also from the IVIE database. The
demographic variables used for instrumentation comes from the Population
Census for the years 1981 and 1991.4 All this data was collected for 17
Spanish Autonomous Communities (all except Ceuta and Melilla).
4.1 Individual Data
The Survey of Family Budgets (1981 and 1991) and the Continuous Survey
of Family Budgets (2000 and 2001) contain earnings information and other
characteristics of family members. To gain accuracy, we restrict the sample
to heads of households aged 16 to 65 who work more than 15 hours per
week as employees. We also eliminate individuals with earnings below the
minimum wage. This yields 7027 individuals for 1981, 8193 for 1991, and
2057 for the years 2000 and 2001. The exact data that we use is:
• Wage earnings: Labor earnings of employees (excluding self-employ-
ment).
• Years of schooling: We use individual years of schooling in the Min-
cerian wage regression to estimate the private return to an additional
year of schooling. This variable is constructed by assigning to each
schooling level the minimum amount of years needed to complete the
degree. Table 1 shows the diﬀerent schooling groups that we deﬁne
and the information of schooling levels contained in the surveys. It can
be seen that there are 8 schooling levels in EPF-81; 10 schooling levels
in EPF-91; and 7 schooling levels in ECPF-00-01. Our results show
that between 1981 and 2001 average of schooling in Spain increased
from 6 to nearly 10 years, with the largest increase occurring during
the 1990s.
2Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, Instituto Nacional de Estadstica,
3Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, Instituto Nacional de Estadstica.








 [ table 1 about here ]
• Schooling level: To implement the constant composition approach we
need to deﬁne schooling levels. We use primary education or less,
secondary education (lower and upper), and college.
• Gender: Always used as a control in the ﬁrst step wage regression.
• Experience: Experience is deﬁned as age minus years of schooling
minus 6.
• Agricultural workers: The ﬁrst step also controls for whether workers
work in agriculture or not.
• Married: The ﬁrst step wage regressions also control for whether work-
ers are married or not.
4.2 Regional Data
We use the following regional data:
• Share of workers by schooling level: Used to obtain average ”cleaned”
wages at the base year labor-force composition for the constant com-
position approach (Source: Human Capital Project Data).
• Fraction of workers with secondary or college education: Used to mea-
sure regional schooling levels (Source: Human Capital Project Data).
• Total workers: Used to measure the size of regions (Source: Active
Population Survey5).
• Physical capital stock and ICT capital stock: Used for robustness
analysis (Source: IVIE Database Data).
• Population proportions for each age group: These data come from the
1981 and 1991 Spanish population and housing censuses, published by
the Spanish National Institute of Statistic (INE).
[ table 2 about here ]
[ table 3 about here ]









Migration across regions implies that regional schooling levels are endoge-
nous. Higher productivity and wages in a region may lead to it attracting
high skilled workers from elsewhere. Another factor that may work in the
same direction is that high income regions may have amenities that are es-
pecially attractive for high skilled workers. Such concerns should be much
attenuated by our panel data approach, which eliminates all permanent dif-
ferences across regions. But residual endogeneity of regional schooling levels
could lead to inconsistent least-squares estimates. We therefore implement
a two-stage least-squares estimation approach with the beginning-of-sample
population structure as an instrument for the change in regional schooling
over the following decade(s). The underlying assumption is that a higher
share of younger people implies a greater increase in average schooling lev-
els in the region. To verify whether this has been the case empirically, we
regress the log change of the population share with more than secondary
school over the 1981-1991 and the 1991-2001 period on the share of the pop-
ulation ages 0-19 and 45-70 in 1981 and 1991 perspectively. The results in
Table 4 show that the signs of the two age groups are as expected and highly
(jointly) statistically signiﬁcant (see also the F-statistic at the bottom of the
table).
[table 4 about here]
5 Estimation and Results
We ﬁrst discuss the results for the Mincerian approach, and then turn to
the results of the constant composition approach.
5.1 The Mincerian approach
Table 5 contains the results of the ﬁrst step wage regressions of the Mincerian
approach. According to the table, the individual return to an additional year
of schooling was 7.4% in 1981, 6.3% in 1991, and 5.6% in 2001. The return
to education and experience are very similar to those found by others studies
(e.g. Abad´ ıe (1997)).
[table 5 about here]
The region-year speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in Table 5 can now be used to obtain
the change in ”cleaned” average regional wages necessary to implement the
second step of the Mincerian approach. The results are in Table 6. Columns
(1) to (4) contain the results for the 1981-2001 period. Columns (5) to (8)








 with diﬀerent intercepts for each decade to permit for diﬀerent trends. .
Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) are obtained using OLS, while columns (2), (4),
(6) and (8) are obtained using two-stage least-squares (2SLS). The strength
of the externality for the pooled 1981-1991 and 1991-2001 period range from
0.153 to 0.261, with estimates statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% and the 5%
level. As we have two instruments per decade, we can test an overidentifying
restriction, which we ﬁnd cannot be rejected at the usual signiﬁcance levels.
The results for the 1981-2001 period yield highly statistically signiﬁcant
externalities of a similar magnitude, between 0.160 and 0.238. Hence, the
Mincerian approach yields statistically signiﬁcant externalities. One way to
get a sense of the magnitude is to note that the share of college and secondary
educated workers rose an average of 5,22% annually between 1981 and 2001.
For example, taking (2) and (6) as our preferred estimations, the strength
of externalities imply that 0.97-1.07% of annual wage growth are explained
by schooling externalities.
[table 6 about here]
5.2 The constant composition approach
The results of the ﬁrst step regression by schooling level are in Table 7.
[table 7 about here]
In the second step we ﬁrst aggregate the region-year and schooling level
ﬁxed eﬀects to obtain region-year average wages holding the labor-force com-





where lsrT is the average of the shares at the end points of the time pe-
riod analyzed. The results of the second step of the constant composition
approach are reported in Table 8. Columns (1)-(4) refer to the 1981-2001
period, while the remaining columns refer to the pooled 1981-1991 and 1991-
2001 periods.
[table 8 about here]
Our results show signiﬁcant schooling externalities, which are robust to
the diﬀerent methods used as well as the period we look at. The strength of
the estimated externalities range from 0.134 to 0.214 for the 1981-2001, and
0.154 to 0.235 for the pooled pediod. The 2SLS coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level if we consider the longest possible period and the 5-10% level
if we pool the 1980s and 1990s. As expected, externalities are weaker with
the constant composition approach than the Mincerian approach. Again,
our preferred estimations of the strength of externalities gives us a real








 growth over this period.6
To compare our results with previous results obtained for Spain, for in-
stance by De la Fuente and Domenech (2005) and Alcala and Hernandez
(2005), we can do the following exercise. According to our results, we esti-
mate the eﬀect of human capital growth in Spain to be a yearly growth in
real wages of 0.8%. This amounts to a total increase of 16% in real wages for
the 1981-2001 period. On the other hand, the growth of our human capital
proxy implies an increase of 4 years of schooling. Therefore the aggregate
return attributable to externalities of one more year of schooling would be
4%. If we assume an average private return between 6% and 7%, we would
have a social return betwen 10% and 11%. Our results are therefore similar
to previous results.
5.3 Comparison of results: signiﬁcance and bias
In the ﬁrst and third column of table 9 the estimated coeﬃcients using the
Mincerian and constant composition approach, respectively, are presented,
while the standard errors can be found in the second and fourth column.
The t-statistic for the diﬀerence can be found in the ﬁfth column, with the
corresponding p-value in the ﬁfth column. The sixth and ﬁnal column shows
the point estimate of the bias. As it can be veriﬁed at the table, the diﬀerence
is not signiﬁcant except for speciﬁcations 1 and 3, while speciﬁcations 2 and
4 are close to signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Despite the fact that for the rest
of speciﬁcations it cannot be assured that there is a positive and signiﬁcant
bias of the Mincerian approach, this may be attributed to a lack of power
in the estimation (and consequently in the test).
The bias is larger for the ﬁrst four speciﬁcations, with an average bias
of 17.6%. For the rest of speciﬁcations the average bias it 5.6%. This has
to be compared with the expected bias of 25% (see section 3.3).
6 Conclusions
The strength of human capital externalities in Spain is important for growth
accounting and from a public-policy perspective. We have applied two dif-
ferent approaches to quantify the wedge between the social and the private
return to schooling at the regional level for the 1981-2001 period. Our re-
sults yield evidence of signiﬁcant schooling externalities. A growth account-
ing exercise yields that approximately a half of the average annual growth








 rate of wages over this period can be accounted for by schooling external-
ities. Ambos m´ etodos ofrecen estimaciones puntuales diferentes pero sin
embargo, dado el bajo sesgo estimado en funci´ on de la f´ oirmula desarrollada
por Ciccone y Peri (2006) y por la escasa potencia de las estimaciones, estas
diferencias no son estad´siticamente signiﬁcativas. Future research could
combine our estimates with the Spanish tax system and education subsidies
to examine whether the incentives to human capital accumulation reﬂect
social returns.
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 Table 1: Schooling groups equivalence. Individual data
EPF 81 EPF 91 ECPF 01
survey survey survey
groups groups groups
Illiterate-Primary 1,2,3 1,2,3,4 1,2
Basic secondary and basic vocational 4 5,7 3
Advanced secondary and advanced vocational 5,6 6,7,8 4,5
College (short cycle) 7 9 6
College (long cycle) 8 10 7
Note:
EPF survey: Encuesta de presupuestos familiares.
ECPF survey: Encuesta Continua de presupuestos familiares
Deﬁnition of the schooling groups:
Groups EPF 81: 1 - Illiterate, 2 - No degree, 3 - Primary,
4 - Basic secondary, 5 - Advanced secondary,
6 - Vocational training, 7 - College (short cycle), 8 - College (long cycle)
Groups EPF 91: 1 - Illiterate, 2 - No degree, 3 - Basic primary,
4 - Advanced primary, 5 - Basic secondary ,6 - Advanced secondary,
7 - Basic vocational training, 8 - Advanced vocational training,
9 - College (short cycle), 10 - College (long cycle)
Groups ECPF 01: 1 - Illiteracy or no degree, 2 - Primary,
3 - Basic secondary and basic vocational training,
4 - Advanced secondary and advanced vocational training,
5 - Other advanced secondary studies,








 Table 2: Average wages for Spanish regions (in pesetas, 1980-2001)
1981 1991 2001
Andaluca 620.771 1.374.273 2.006.496
Aragn 726.164 1.552.504 2.404.515
Asturias 770.411 1.615.257 2.505.721
Baleares 670.676 1.460.103 2.191.425
Canarias 644.695 1.387.754 2.020.738
Cantabria 711.886 1.596.316 2.242.165
Castilla y Leon 690.036 1.567.936 2.155.668
Castilla-La Mancha 626.355 1.419.734 2.010.670
Catalua 779.218 1.709.741 2.393.477
Comunidad Valenciana 675.078 1.389.134 2.207.454
Extremadura 541.652 1.320.384 1.760.094
Galicia 683.013 1.452.852 2.153.270
Madrid 815.915 1.657.278 2.468.719
Murcia 597.704 1.388.218 1.942.676
Navarra 801.067 1.777.856 2.683.833
Pas Vasco 803.115 1.758.933 2.381.716
La Rioja 697.790 1.531.849 2.183.584








 Table 3: Average wages by schooling groups (in pesetas, 1980-2001)
1981 1991 2001
mean 612.622 1.266.508 1.932.901
Primary or less
stdv 278.190 584.631 652.061
mean 821.892 1.721.526 2.395.398
Secondary
stdv 324.575 1.182.154 886.831
mean 1.061.663 2.323.486 2.842.428
College
stdv 371.898 938.236 1.027.295
mean 694.516 1.514.939 2.232.096
All








 Table 4: First stage regression
Dependent variable:
Log change in fraction of workers
















Note: This regression estimates the relationship between our regional
human capital intensity proxy (LED) and the instruments.








 Table 5: Mincer Regressions
1981 1991 2001
Aragon 0.120 0.161 0.106
(0.019) (0.022) (0.030)
Asturias 0.145 0.167 0.133
(0.024) (0.034) (0.028)
Baleares 0.036 ** 0.110 0.100
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036)
Canarias 0.030 ** -0.004 ** -0.028 **
(0.022) (0.025) (0.030)
Cantabria 0.079 * 0.128 0.021 **
(0.027) (0.037) (0.038)
Castilla y Leon 0.058 0.109 0.001 **
(0.014) (0.016) (0.025)
Castilla-La Mancha 0.015 ** 0.084 0.008 **
(0.017) (0.019) (0.029)
Catalunya 0.192 0.181 0.114
(0.015) (0.019) (0.021)
Com. Valenciana 0.098 0.078 0.079
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022)
Extremadura -0.167 -0.041 ** -0.098
(0.022) (0.027) (0.031)
Galicia 0.024 ** 0.064 -0.006 **
(0.018) (0.019) (0.027)
Madrid 0.184 0.129 0.101
(0.017) (0.023) (0.021)
Murcia 0.011 ** 0.042 ** -0.047 **
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Navarra 0.244 0.263 0.211
(0.032) (0.034) (0.035)
Pais Vasco 0.238 0.217 0.100
(0.018) (0.019) (0.027)
Rioja (La) 0.111 0.029 ** 0.035 **
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035)








 Table 5–Continued from previous page
1981 1991 2001
Female dummy -0.210 -0.253 -0.168
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Works in agriculture dummy -0.450 -0.435 -0.212
(0.014) (0.019) (0.028)
Married 0.361 0.086 0.033**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.033)
Years of schooling 0.074 0.063 0.056
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Experience 0.019 0.034 0.029
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Experience square 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 11.969 12.908 13.472
(0.039) (0.040) (0.045)
n 11402 8838 3751
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.31 0.28
Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level unless otherwise noted:









 Table 6: Mincerian approach estimation
Dependent variable: Change in regional eﬀects
1981-2001 1981-1991-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LED 0.160 0.187 0.208 0.238 0.153 0.206 0.192 0.261
(0.056)* (0.071)* (0.068)* (0.083)* (0.076)** (0.089)* (0.094)** (0.110)*
1990s dummy - - - - -0.372 -0.350 -0.355 -0.326
- - - - (0.035) (0.039) (0.042) (0.048)
Employment - - 0.171 0.169 - - 0.080 0.098
- - (0.149)*** (0.153)*** - - (0.104)*** (0.106)***
Capital - - 0.042 0.180 - - 0.002 -0.032
- - (0.144)*** (0.152)*** - - (0.158)*** (0.162)***
ICT Capital - - -0.088 -0.145 - - -0.032 -0.040
- - (0.131)*** (0.140)*** - - (0.092)*** (0.093)***
Constant 1,320 1,291 1,294 1,214 0.849 0.811 0.837 0.803
(0.060) (0.075) (0.106) (0.124) (0.056) (0.065) (0.080) (0.085)
Observations 17 17 17 17 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.35 0.32 0.45 0.42 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Note:
Standard errors in parentheses
LED: growth rate of the share of workers with secondary degrees or higher
1990s dummy: dummy equal to 1 for the 1991-2001 period
Employment: Log change of regional employment.
Capital: Log changes of regional physical capital.
ICT Capital: Log changes of regional ICT physical capital.
Models:
(1)-(4): pooled regressions for periods 1981-1991 and 1991-2001
(5)-(8): regressions for 1981-2001
(1),(3),(5),(7): OLS estimations
(2),(4),(6),(8): two-stage least-squares estimations.
Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level unless otherwise noted:
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level









 Table 7: First step wage regressions by schooling level
Independent variable: Year Regression 1: Regression 2: Regression 3:
individual wages Primary Secondary College
or less
Andaluca 91 0.663 0.752 0.719
01 1.356 1.311 1.123
Aragon 81 0.147 0.119 0.026 ***
91 0.904 0.878 0.667
01 1.482 1.361 1.293
Asturias 81 0.193 0.073 *** 0.122
91 0.932 0.804 0.733
01 1.563 1.332 1.261
Baleares 81 0.042 *** -0.024 *** 0.301
91 0.836 0.877 0.558
01 1.488 1.412 1.148
Canarias 81 0.027 *** 0.072 *** 0.073 ***
91 0.671 0.776 0.715
01 1.358 1.159 1.217
Cantabria 81 0.149 0.043 *** -0.158 **
91 0.882 0.705 0.886
01 1.452 1.236 1.102
Castilla y Leon 81 0.105 0.017 *** -0.053 ***
91 0.835 0.789 0.733
01 1.382 1.250 1.176
Castilla-La Mancha 81 0.023 *** 0.075 ** -0.108 **
91 0.787 0.796 0.743
01 1.401 1.271 1.172
Catalunya 81 0.228 0.183 0.128
91 0.902 0.855 0.829
01 1.476 1.456 1.218
Com. Valenciana 81 0.122 0.077 ** 0.106 **
91 0.805 0.729 0.660
01 1.450 1.421 1.220
Extremadura 81 -0.198 0.073 *** -0.087 ***
91 0.663 0.669 0.629
01 1.301 1.172 1.131








 Table 7 –continued from previous page
Independent variable: year Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
individual wages Primary Secondary College
or less
Galicia 81 0.016 *** 0.090 * 0.054 ***
91 0.768 0.778 0.734
01 1.355 1.295 1.155
Madrid 81 0.218 0.186 0.124
91 0.873 0.811 0.715
01 1.493 1.357 1.241
Murcia 81 0.050 *** -0.074 *** -0.172 **
91 0.743 0.746 0.732
01 1.355 1.232 1.056
Navarra 81 0.286 0.241 -0.042 ***
91 1.026 0.913 0.851
01 1.628 1.502 1.284
Pas Vasco 81 0.270 0.212 0.189
91 0.968 0.844 0.802
01 1.527 1.366 1.156
Rioja (La) 81 0.166 0.106 *** -0.119 ***
91 0.784 0.577 0.703
01 1.391 1.330 1.268
Female dummy -0.278 -0.179 -0.125
Works in agriculture dummy -0.407 -0.311 0.027 ***
Married 0.168 0.231 0.229
Experience 0.030 0.027 0.025
Experience square 0.000 0.000 0.000
Constant 12.559 12.932 13.364
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.51 0.57
n 15,930 4,496 3,274
Note: Standard errors are not reported.
Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level unless otherwise noted:
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level









 Table 8: Constant Composition approach estimation.
Dependent variable: log changes in weighted average wages (weights are for year 1990 for 1981-2001 estimation
and middle year for 1981-1991-2001 estimation).
1981-2001 1981-1991-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LED 0.134 0.167 0.163 0.214 0.154 0.192 0.183 0.235
[0.056]* [0.069]* [0.071]* [0.079]* [0.081]** [0.094]* [0.101]** [0.118]**
1990s dummy - - - - -0.000 0.016 0.012 0.033
- - - - [0.037]*** [0.042]*** [0.045]*** [0.051]***
Employment - - 0.121 0.134 - - 0.021 0.034
- - [0.155]*** [0.147]*** - - [0.112]*** [0.114]***
Capital - - 0.093 0.214 - - -0.023 -0.048
- - [0.149]*** [0.145]*** - - [0.170]*** [0.173]***
ICT Capital - - -0.108 -0.169 - - -0.037 -0.043
- - [0.136]*** [0.135]*** - - [0.098]*** [0.099]***
Constant 1,127 1,092 1,105 1,017 0.553 0.525 0.565 0.540
[0.060] [0.073] [0.110] [0.119] [0.060] [0.069] [0.086] [0.091]
Observations 17 17 17 17 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.27 0.28 0.34 0.41 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.37
Note:
Standard errors in parentheses.
LED: growth rate of share of workers with secondary degrees or higher.
1990s dummy: dummy equal to 1 for the 1991-2001 period.
Employment: Log change of regional employment.
Capital: Log changes of regional physical capital.
Models:
(1)–(4): pooled regressions for 1981-1991, and 1991-2001 periods.
(5)–(8): regressions for the 1981-2001 period.
(1),(3),(5),(7): OLS estimations.
(2),(4),(6),(8): two-stage least-squares regressions.
Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level unless otherwise noted:
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level









 Table 9: Bias due to using Mincerian Approach instead of the Constant
Composition Approach.
Mincerian Constant Composition
Regression Coeﬃcient Stand. error Coeﬃcient Stand. error t P-value Bias
(1) 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.06 1.914 0.0300 19.40
(2) 0.19 0.07 0.17 0.07 1.177 0.1215 11.98
(3) 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.07 2.669 0.0048 27.61
(4) 0.24 0.08 0.21 0.08 1.221 0.1132 11.21
(5) 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.08 -0.050 0.5290 -0.65
(6) 0.21 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.631 0.2652 7.29
(7) 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.383 0.3525 4.92
(8) 0.26 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.940 0.1754 11.06
The regressions are those speciﬁed in tables 6 and 8
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